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1  INTRODUCTION
1 
In March 2007, the European Union celebrated the 50
th anniversary of the Treaty of 
Rome. Yet amid the festivities, overtones of crisis were hard to dispel. Economically, 
progress in meeting the Lisbon Goal of becoming ‘the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-driven economy in the world’ by 2010 (European Council 2000) has thus far 
been meager. Politically, a convincing response to the rejection of the Draft Constitution 
in the French and Dutch referenda of 2005 has yet to be found. These failures have 
reinvigorated debates about a possible legitimacy crisis of the European Union (Føllesdal 
2006; 2007), which come in both normative and empirical variants: Normatively, they 
tend to focus on the democratic quality of EU institutions; empirically, they discuss 
whether the Union’s acceptance in the population might be under threat.  
While academic debates about the EU’s normative legitimacy have reached a 
relatively high level of conceptual sophistication, and most of the remaining points of 
contention can be traced back to ultimately irreconcilable differences between various 
views of democracy, considerably less is known about the Union’s empirical legitimacy. 
In spite of the regular Eurobarometer reports, there is little reliable data on what 
Europeans value about the EU, why they accept or oppose its institutions, and on what 
criteria they base such assessments. Are different evaluative benchmarks used when 
people judge the legitimacy of the EU, as opposed to the nation state? Are democratic 
standards less important compared to output- and performance-oriented criteria? In which 
                                                 
1   Many ideas presented in this paper grew out of my collaboration with Zuzana Krell-Laluhová, Frank 
Nullmeier, Steffen Schneider and Achim Wiesner in the TranState Research Center at the University of 
Bremen (Germany). 
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relevant respects is the EU seen as doing well, and which aspects of its activities are seen 
as generating legitimacy problems? 
What is more, we also have insufficient understanding about the ways in which the 
interplay of various political levels in the EU’s multilevel system impacts on the citizens’ 
legitimacy assessments. Many discussions assume that the putative legitimacy deficits of 
the EU encroach on the legitimacy of its member states as well, thus leading to a general 
erosion of legitimacy in Europe (Scharpf 1999, 2000). One should note, however, that the 
existence of multiple political levels does not by necessity hurt their legitimacy in the 
eyes of the citizens. After all, we can also conceive of legitimacy evaluations in which 
legitimacy deficits of one level of governance (e.g., the EU) bolster the legitimacy of the 
other (e.g., the nation state), or even of evaluations in which the interplay of these levels 
reinforces the legitimacy of each of them (Hurrelmann 2007b). Which of these 
constructions – if they are empirically relevant at all – dominates in the citizens’ 
legitimacy assessments about the EU? 
In this paper, I argue that the most promising way to answer these questions is to 
focus on the construction and transformation of legitimacy in public discourse. In other 
words, the dominant strand of empirical legitimacy research in the EU – public opinion 
surveys such as the Eurobarometer – should be complemented by an approach that 
focuses on political communication (see also Schneider, Nullmeier and Hurrelmann 
2007). After sketching how a focus on communication might help to alleviate some of the 
deficiencies of existing research on the EU’s empirical legitimacy (Section 2), I apply 
this approach in a study of British and German media debates surrounding EU 
enlargement, the Draft Constitution, and the 2004 election to the European Parliament 
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(Sections 2 to 4). The paper yield insights into the construction of legitimating and 
delegitimating arguments about EU institutions, as well as into the ways in which these 
are related to evaluations of the member states. 
2  THE EMPIRICAL LEGITIMACY OF THE EU: ON THE BENEFITS OF A 
DISCOURSE-ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE  
The concept of empirical legitimacy should be distinguished from the more general 
notion of support for a political system (Hurrelmann, Schneider and Steffek 2007). In 
contrast to support, which might be based on normative as well as on instrumental 
considerations, legitimacy denotes a form of acceptance that is based on reasoned 
judgements about the normative rightfulness of political rule (Barker 1990, 20-44; Gilley 
2006). This implies that motivations such as habitual obedience, the fear of sanctions, or 
individual cost-benefit calculations do not generate political legitimacy, since legitimacy 
must be based on normative claims of a generalizable character – although the specific 
contents of these claims may of course vary. Given this inescapably normative character 
of any legitimacy evaluation, the difference between a normative and an empirical 
perspective on legitimacy is simply that in the latter case, social scientists take an 
observer’s role, not performing the relevant evaluations themselves, but examining other 
actors’ judgements, and the criteria used in the process (Barker 2007).  
On the basis of these definitions, it might well be questioned whether the attitudes 
of many Europeans towards the EU have anything to do with empirical legitimacy at all. 
After all, the model of a ‘permissive consensus’ still seems to be appropriate for large 
parts of the European population, who lack sufficient information and interest to perform 
reasoned evaluations of the EU, and merely acquiesce to its policies (Moravcsik 2006; 
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Hurrelmann 2007a). According to the Eurobarometer, the average level of subjective 
(self-reported) knowledge of the EU is only 4.5 on a 10-point scale, and less than half of 
the population state that they ‘understand how the EU works’ (European Commission 
2006a, 104-12). What does it mean, in this light, when the same Eurobarometer reveals 
that citizens on average place more trust in EU institutions than in national parliaments 
and governments (ibid., 50-7)? Does it indicate political legitimacy, or should it rather be 
seen as a ‘disguised non-response’ that signals ‘a resigned recognition of […] 
incompetence’, as Pierre Bourdieu (1984, 417) once argued about similar data? At the 
very least, the widespread lack of knowledge about the EU sheds doubt on ‘the 
intellectualist premise that every answer to a political question is the product of an act of 
political judgement’ (ibid., 418), and hence on the claim that the legitimacy of the EU can 
be gauged by public opinion surveys of the general population.  
Yet even if we assume that substantial parts of the European population have now 
moved beyond the permissive consensus, and that we can therefore take their responses at 
face value, problems with the dominant survey-oriented approach to empirical legitimacy 
research remain. The most serious one is that public opinion surveys are an entirely 
reactive method, offering respondents a pre-selection of institutions to be assessed and 
evaluative benchmarks to be used (Schneider, Nullmeier and Hurrelmann 2007). For 
example, recent Eurobarometer surveys have tried to uncover reasons for people’s 
feelings towards the EU by asking them whether their country’s EU membership has 
contributed to personal safety (47% positive responses v. 44% negative ones), economic 
stability (45% positive, 45% negative), political stability (41% positive, 48% negative), 
and the protection of their country’s interests (38% positive, 46% negative) (European 
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Commission 2006a, 85), as well as by confronting them with a list of values for which 
the EU allegedly stands: human rights (associated with the EU by 38% of respondents), 
democracy (38%), peace (36%), the rule of law (24%), respect for other cultures (19%), 
solidarity (17%), equality (14%), respect for human life (13%), tolerance (11%), 
individual freedom (10%), self-fulfillment (4%), and religion (3%) (European 
Commission 2006b, 34). Yet such lists are of limited value for drawing inferences on the 
EU’s empirical legitimacy, not only because one might question their exhaustiveness and 
criticize their implicit pro-EU bias (note that negative principles that could be associated 
with the EU are not even mentioned), but more fundamentally because they do not allow 
researchers to identify the aspects of political orders and evaluative standards that 
respondents would highlight themselves, without the stimuli provided by the 
questionnaire. The data that public opinion surveys can generate about the EU’s 
legitimacy are thus necessarily artificial, ‘battery reared’ rather than ‘free range’, as 
Rodney Barker (2000, 228) has put it. 
A third limitation of public opinion research on the empirical legitimacy of the EU 
concerns its ability to come to terms with various types of multilevel legitimacy. As 
explained above, the concept of multilevel legitimacy assumes that the citizens’ 
legitimacy evaluations in the EU are increasingly influenced by the interplay of European 
and member state institutions (Hurrelmann 2007b). We can distinguish two forms of 
multilevel legitimacy: multiunit assessments establish explicit relationships between the 
legitimacy of EU and member state institutions, while integrated assessments evaluate 
the European multilevel system as a whole. Undeniably, public opinion studies working 
with Eurobarometer data have contributed to our understanding of such forms of 
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multilevel legitimacy by establishing that correlations exist between the citizens’ attitudes 
to the EU and to their home country (Anderson 1998; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; 
Rohrschneider 2002; Kritzinger 2003; Hooghe and Marks 2005). However, such studies 
have had considerable difficulties in interpreting their findings: First, the evidence is 
contradictory as to whether a positive orientation towards national institutions or a strong 
attachment to one’s own state leads to increased EU support (Anderson 1998; with some 
qualifications also Hooghe and Marks 2005) or whether it results in opposition to 
European integration (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; Rohrschneider 2002; Kritzinger 2003).
2 
Second, correlations alone are insufficient to determine whether linkages between EU-
related and member state-related evaluations are merely the product of insufficient 
information about the EU, which forces citizens to use national institutions as ‘proxies’ 
when asked to assess the EU (Anderson 1998; Kritzinger 2003), or whether they reflect 
genuine evaluations of the interplay between both levels of government. One factor that 
contributes to this ambiguity is certainly that multilevel assessments can be expected to 
                                                 
2   Most of these studies also qualify their findings in several respects. For instance, Robert 
Rohrschneider’s (2002) model of a zero-sum relationship between the legitimacy of the EU and its 
member states is asymmetrical in the sense that a positive assessment of national institutions results in 
lower legitimacy of the EU, whereas a negative assessment of national institutions does not increase the 
EU’s legitimacy. Sylvia Kritzinger’s (2003) model shows that attitudes towards the nation state 
negatively affect attitudes towards the principle of European unification, but positively affect attitudes 
towards concrete EU institutions. In her interpretation, this result suggests that ‘people attribute more 
than just one dimension to the EU’ (ibid., 233). And even in the studies that generally find positive 
correlations between national identities and EU support, research consistently shows that exclusive 
national identities – i.e., identity constructions that perceive a contradiction between national and 
European attachments – result in lower support for European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2005). 
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follow different logics of construction at various points in time, various places, or within 
various subgroups of the population.
3 The ways in which public opinion surveys are 
interpreted are generally not context-sensitive enough to identify such differences. 
In what follows, I want to suggest that these deficiencies of existing research can be 
addressed by complementing public opinion studies with research that focuses on the 
communicative dimension of legitimacy (Schneider, Nullmeier and Hurrelmann 2007). 
The basic idea of this approach is that legitimacy evaluations of political institutions, as 
well as the normative criteria on which they are based, are developed and modified, 
affirmed and contested in communicative processes. An analysis of such processes with 
text or discourse analytical methods can generate important insights into a political 
system’s legitimacy. Compared to public opinion studies, it has the advantage of focusing 
on explicit legitimacy evaluations rather than a ‘permissive consensus’, relying on natural 
data rather than responses to artificially generated stimuli, and allowing for an in-depth 
analysis of the ways in which legitimating or delegitimating evaluations are constructed 
and framed (which encompasses the use of multiunit and integrated assessments). 
                                                 
3   This picture, in any case, is suggested by studies on the relationship between European and national 
identities, a topic that has attracted greater research interest than legitimacy relationships in a strict 
sense. Evidence obtained by various techniques – survey research (Duchesne and Frognier 1995; 
Marks 1999; Citrin and Sides 2004), studies of elite discourses (Marcussen et al. 1999; Risse 2001), as 
well as small group experiments (Mlicki and Ellemers 1996; Cinnirella 1997) – all show that while 
there is no necessary contradiction between a person’s attachment to her nation state and to the EU, the 
relationship between national and European identities can take many forms, depending on the ways in 
which these identities are constructed in public discourses and/or an individual’s self-image.  
 Multilevel Legitimacy in the European Union  Page 9  
Obviously, legitimacy-related communication takes place in a wide range of 
discursive arenas – from private settings to public fora – and a truly comprehensive study 
of legitimation discourses would have to cover all of them. The most important forum for 
such discourses in modern democracies, however, is the mass media. While the media 
undeniably constitute an arena that is dominated by political elites, and one should thus 
be careful to generalize from media discourses to the discourses of the general 
population, it is safe to assume that legitimacy-related claims that are prominent in the 
media have an agenda-setting function for other discursive arenas. To generate new 
insights into the empirical legitimacy of the EU, research on the mass media hence seems 
to be particularly promising. 
3  BRITISH AND GERMAN DEBATES ABOUT THE EU: HOW TO STUDY MASS 
MEDIA LEGITIMACY DISCOURSES 
When it comes to attitudes towards the EU, the United Kingdom and Germany can be 
considered opposite extremes: While the UK is often seen as an ‘awkward partner’ in 
European integration whose imperial history, insular geography and majoritarian politics 
have contributed to unusually high levels of Euroscepticism (George 1998; Geddes 
2004), Germany – at least at the elite level – has wholeheartedly embraced the European 
project as an alternative to discredited visions of German dominance in Europe 
(Anderson 1999). A comparison of the UK and Germany can hence be expected to 
uncover substantial national differences concerning the ways in which the EU and its 
core institutions are being legitimated and/or delegitimated.  
To be sure, there is relatively little point in proving what is evident anyways, 
namely that British newspapers are generally more EU-critical than German ones. What 
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is much more interesting is to take a closer look at how both positive and negative 
legitimacy evaluations in both countries are constructed: From what kind of debates do 
they originate, which EU institutions do they refer to, and which criteria do they make 
use of? To answer these questions in an empirical study of media discourses, it is 
important that the sample of texts from both countries contains an adequate number of 
legitimating as well as delegitimating assessments. For this reason, a relatively Euro-
friendly British quality newspaper – The Guardian – was selected for this study. Articles 
from the Guardian were compared to a German paper of a similar political orientation, 
the Süddeutsche Zeitung.
4 The study focused on one of the most interesting time periods 
in recent EU history, namely the four months between April and July 2004, when the 
biggest enlargement in EU history took place, an election to the European Parliament 
(EP) was held, and the heads of state and government finished their negotiations on the 
Draft European Constitution. In addition, this time period also witnessed important policy 
developments, such as the decision by the European Court of Justice on the Stability and 
Growth Pact.  
Drawing on a methodology first developed for the analysis of legitimacy discourses 
at the nation-state level (Hurrelmann et al. 2005; 2006; Schneider, Nullmeier and 
Hurrelmann 2007), all articles published in this time period in one of the two newspapers 
were taken into account for this analysis if they contained at least one legitimation 
                                                 
4   The study concentrates on high-quality newspapers since these can be expected to contain particularly 
diverse and elaborate arguments; furthermore, high-quality papers are particularly relevant since they 
fulfil an inter-media agenda-setter function (i.e., the issues they identify as relevant are often taken up 
by other media). 
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statement about the EU or one of its institutions.
5 In line with the conception of empirical 
legitimacy developed above, legitimation statements were defined as evaluative 
propositions: A statement advanced in media reporting or commentary was considered 
relevant for the empirical legitimacy of the EU if it contained an explicit – negative or 
positive – evaluation of the Union’s rightfulness, usually pointing to a specific criterion 
(e.g., portraying it as democratic or undemocratic, efficient or inefficient, etc.). This 
focus on evaluative statements, which excludes descriptive or directive speech acts like 
the formulation of political demands, makes sure that the method does not measure 
political proposals, let alone a ‘permissive consensus’, but zeroes in on judgements about 
the political system’s legitimacy in a strict sense.
6 On the other hand, we should note that 
this approach does not tell us whether a statement is intended to have any immediate 
implications for political action (withdrawal from the EU, disobedience with its policies, 
etc.), even though some scholars consider such action the ultimate indicator of legitimacy 
(e.g., Barker 2001; 2003). Whether legitimation statements result in a specific kind of 
political behavior can only be assessed in the long run: Evaluations that are used in a 
                                                 
5   The articles selected could be news reports, commentaries, or features from any section of the papers. 
The statements reflect content advanced by the authors themselves or by some person quoted in the 
articles. Texts were retrieved from an electronic media database in a two-step procedure, using 
automated search routines for the pre-selection of texts, and a close reading of paragraphs containing 
search words for the final selection.  
6   Legitimation statements hence differ from the ‘claims’ analyzed in political claims analysis, which are 
defined as ‘purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms 
or physical attacks’ (Koopmans 2007, 189).  
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consistent fashion over an extended period of time can be expected to shape political 
activities as well, while more idiosyncratic statements are unlikely to have such effects. 
The core advantage of the focus on legitimation statements is that they allow us to 
identify, in a ‘free-range’ setting, the specific institutions to which legitimacy evaluations 
refer (objects of legitimation), as well as the criteria that are used to support the 
evaluation (patterns of legitimation). As for objects of legitimation, this study worked 
with a deliberately restrictive list that excluded evaluations of political actors, specific 
policies or future political projects, and concentrated only on statements that referred 
either to the EU in its existing form (or to the principle of European integration), to one 
of the EU institutions, or to ‘Europe’ in a general sense, understood as an entity 
encompassing both the Union and its member states. As will be discussed below, most 
statements of the latter type constitute examples of multilevel legitimacy in which 
assessments of the EU and its member states are amalgamated to form an integrated 
evaluation.  
With respect to patterns of legitimation, the study’s starting point was to distinguish 
between evaluations that were input-oriented, referring to the processes by which 
political decisions in the EU are made, and those that were output-oriented, pointing to 
the contents and outcomes of EU governance (for this distinction, Scharpf 1999, 6-28). 
On the basis of the empirical material, and informed by political theory as well as 
existing discussions about the legitimacy of the EU, both categories were later divided 
into a number of subcategories. Table 1 shows the patterns that resulted, as well as their 
definition; it clearly indicates that the diversity of output-oriented criteria used in 
legitimacy discourses about the EU was greater than that of input-oriented criteria. 
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Table 1 Patterns of Legitimation  
Input-oriented  Output-oriented 
Democracy/popular sovereignty: 
Decisions can be traced back 
to the people, accountability 
and responsiveness is 
ensured 
Legality/rule of law: Decisions 
follow legal rules, corruption 
is prevented 
Popular support/trust: Decisions 
and institutions enjoy the 
factual support of the people 
Capability to act/effectiveness: Political problems are dealt with in a 
flexible and expedient way 
Economic performance: The citizens’ or member states’ economic 
well-being is secured and/or promoted 
Peace/unity: The peaceful development and integration of the 
continent is secured and/or promoted 
Human rights/freedom: The protection of individual rights and liberty 
is secured and/or promoted 
Social solidarity/welfare: The solidarity between citizens and their 
social welfare is secured/promoted 
European interests/values/identities: Common ideas and concerns of 
all Europeans are addressed and/or reflected in institutions 
National interests/values/identities: Concerns of the member states are 
addressed and/or reflected in institutions 
Positive role in the world: A powerful and/or respected position in 
world politics is secured and/or promoted 
 
To sum up: A legitimation statement has this structure: [Object X] [is (il)legitimate] 
[because of Pattern Y]. Evaluative propositions in newspaper articles that contained these 
elements were selected for the analysis; for coding purposes their wording was 
‘translated’ into this grammatical structure.
7 Individual legitimation statements, rather 
than the articles from which they were drawn, constituted the basic unit for the empirical 
analysis that follows. Five variables were coded for each statement: object of 
legitimation, assessment as legitimate or illegitimate, pattern of legitimation, as well as 
the topic of the article from which the statement originated and the possible use of 
multilevel legitimacy constructions. 
                                                 
7   Obviously, selection and coding entailed a considerable amount of interpretation. In order to ensure 
reliability, both tasks were not delegated to non-expert coders but rather performed by the author 
himself. 
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4  OBJECTS AND PATTERNS OF LEGITIMATION: HOW LEGITIMACY 
EVALUATIONS OF THE EU ARE CONSTRUCTED 
All in all, 354 statements on the legitimacy of the EU were identified in the material (187 
from the Guardian, 167 from the Süddeutsche Zeitung), which stemmed from 214 articles 
(98 from the Guardian, 116 from the Süddeutsche Zeitung). As might have been 
expected, the majority of the British statements were delegitimating (56.7% negative 
evaluations as opposed to 43.3% positive ones), while most German statements were 
legitimating in character (44.9% negative evaluations, 55.1% positive ones). Given that 
the study deliberately focused on EU-friendly newspapers, the relatively even distribution 
of legitimating and delegitimating statements should not come as a surprise. It is worth 
noting, however, that parallel research on the legitimacy of nation-state institutions in the 
UK and Germany pointed to substantially lower legitimacy levels (Hurrelmann et al. 
2006), which indicates that at least in the Guardian and the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the EU 
was in fact evaluated more positively than the British and German nation state.
8  
 
 
 
                                                 
8   For the whole year 2004, our study of nation-state institutions found that in the Guardian, 65.6% of all 
legitimation statements on domestic British institutions were delegitimating. In the Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 58.5% of the evaluations of German institutions turned out negative. 
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Table 2 Main Topics of Articles Containing Legitimation Statements 
  United Kingdom  Germany 
...of which  ...of which 
Topic of article 
Number of 
statements  Delegiti-
mating  
Legiti-
mating  
Number of 
statements)  Delegiti-
mating  
Legiti-
mating  
EU enlargement 
8  
(4.3%) 
1 
(12.5%) 
7  
(87.5%) 
31  
(18.6%) 
14 
(45.2%) 
17 
(54.8%) 
EU Constitution 
83  
(44.4%) 
44 
(53.0%) 
39 
(47.0%) 
38  
(22.8%) 
10 
(26.3%) 
28 
(73.7%) 
EP election 
66  
(35.3%) 
39 
(59.1%) 
27 
(40.9%) 
41  
(24.6%) 
27 
(65.9%) 
14 
(34.1%) 
Other issue of EU 
politics 
22 
(11.8%) 
15 
(68.2%) 
7 
(31.8%) 
21 
(12.6%) 
11 
(52.4%) 
10 
(47.6%) 
Issue of domestic 
politics 
3 
(1.6%) 
3 
(100.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
12 
(7.2%) 
3 
(25.0%) 
9 
(75.0%) 
Others (e.g., arts and 
culture, third countries) 
3  
(1.6%) 
2 
(66.7%) 
1 
(33.3%) 
24  
(14.4%) 
10 
(41.7%) 
14 
(58.3%) 
Total 
187  
(100.0%) 
106 
(56.7%) 
81 
(43.3%) 
167  
(100.0%) 
75 
(44.9%) 
92 
(55.1%) 
 
To understand the construction of legitimacy assessments about the EU, a first relevant 
variable are the topics of the articles from which legitimation statements were drawn. As 
Table 2 shows, the three main events that took place in the time period examined – EU 
enlargement, the constitutional debate and the EP election – were of roughly equal 
importance in Germany, each generating about 20% of the statements. Statements drawn 
from articles about the constitutional talks were overwhelmingly legitimating, statements 
from articles about enlargement displayed a slight legitimating tendency, while 
statements from articles about the EP election were mainly delegitimating. In the UK, 
enlargement hardly played a role in generating legitimation statements, and the 
constitutional talks alone accounted for almost half of the statements (although 
evaluations of the Constitution itself, constituting a political project rather than an 
existing EU institution, were not included in the analysis). One can hypothesize that the 
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lack of a sustained legitimacy debate on enlargement, which is generally seen as a 
particular successful aspect of the EU’s recent history, goes some way in explaining why 
the overall tendency of the British legitimation debates was negative. Much like in 
Germany, the EP election – though in theory constituting a crucial legitimating device for 
the EU – was the one of the three core events that was associated with the greatest share 
of delegitimating statements. 
If we look at the less important topics, we can see that in both countries, issues of 
EU politics other than the three key events – mainly policy-related problems like the 
Stability and Growth Pact – tended to generate legitimation statements that were 
delegitimating at a rate higher than average. Finally, evaluations of the EU that originated 
from debates about domestic politics – e.g., affirmations of ‘Europe’ as a ‘community of 
values’ in the context of debates about national identity – played a substantial role only in 
Germany, a fact that might be taken as a first indication for a greater propensity of 
German debates towards multilevel legitimacy (see Section 5 below).  
The most important finding on objects of legitimation is the undifferentiated 
character of most media discourse about the EU. In both countries, the majority of all 
legitimation statements referred to the EU as a whole (or to the principle of European 
integration), rather than to specific EU institutions (Table 3). Of the individual EU 
institutions, only the European Parliament was mentioned in a relevant share of articles – 
and mainly judged very critically. Again, this indicates that in the view of elites that 
shape national public discourse, the European Parliament is not adequately fulfilling its 
role as a legitimating device for the Union. It is also interesting to see that references to 
‘Europe’ as an entity encompassing both the EU and its member states were common 
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particularly in Germany, where they tended to result in legitimating evaluations in a high 
percentage of cases.
9 This issue will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, 
which turns to constructions of multilevel legitimacy. 
Table 3 Objects of Legitimation in Media Statements 
  United Kingdom  Germany 
...of which  ...of which 
Object of legitimation 
Number of 
statements  Delegiti-
mating  
Legiti-
mating  
Number of 
statements)  Delegiti-
mating  
Legiti-
mating  
European Union 
137  
(73.3%) 
72 
(52.6%) 
65 
(47.4%) 
87  
(52.1%) 
47 
(54.0%) 
40 
(46.0%) 
European Parliament 
7  
(3.7%) 
6 
(85.7%) 
1 
(14.3%) 
14  
(8.4%) 
8 
(57.1%) 
6 
(42.9%) 
Other EU institution 
13  
(7.0%) 
10 
(76.9%) 
3 
(23.1%) 
2  
(1.2%) 
2 
(100.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
‘Europe’ 
30  
(16.0%) 
18 
(60.0%) 
12 
(40.0%) 
64  
(38.3%) 
18 
(28.1%) 
46 
(71.9%) 
Total 
187  
(100.0%) 
106 
(56.7%) 
81 
(43.3%) 
167  
(100.0%) 
75 
(44.9%) 
92 
(55.1%) 
 
With respect to patterns of legitimation, the statements examined in this study lend 
support to Fritz Scharpf’s assertion that ‘the European polity […] can, for the time being, 
only aspire to [output-oriented legitimacy]’ (1999, 12). In both countries, legitimation 
statements that judged the EU and its institutions against input-oriented standards like 
democracy, legality and popular trust overwhelmingly resulted in delegitimating 
evaluations (Table 4). Output-oriented evaluations, by contrast, were not only more 
common – they were used almost twice as often in the British debates and almost three 
                                                 
9   Due to imprecise use of language, it was sometimes difficult to determine whether a statement referred 
to the EU or to Europe as an integrated entity. The coding rule was to stick with the wording used in the 
original text except in cases in which it was clear from the context that another meaning was intended.  
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times as often in the German ones – but also displayed clear tendencies towards 
legitimation.  
Table 4 Patterns of Legitimation in Media Statements 
  United Kingdom  Germany 
...of which  ...of which 
Pattern of legitimation 
Number of 
statements  Delegiti-
mating  
Legiti-
mating  
Number of 
statements)  Delegiti-
mating  
Legiti-
mating  
Democracy/popular 
sovereignty 
25  
(13.4%) 
22 
(88.0%) 
3 
(12.0%) 
24 
(14.4%) 
14 
(58.3%) 
10 
(41.7%) 
Legality/rule of law 
8  
(4.3%) 
8 
(100.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(0.6%) 
1 
(100.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Popular support/trust 
30  
(16.0%) 
28 
(93.3%) 
2 
(6.7%) 
15 
(9.0%) 
13 
(86.7%) 
2 
(13.3%) 
Sum input-oriented 
patterns 
63 
(33.7%) 
58 
(92.1%) 
5 
(7.9%) 
40 
(24.0%) 
28 
(70.0%) 
12 
(30.0%) 
Capability to act/ 
effectiveness 
7  
(3.7%) 
5 
(71.4%) 
2 
(28.6%) 
10 
(6.0%) 
6 
(60.0%) 
4 
(40.0%) 
Economic  
performance 
21  
(11.2%) 
12 
(57.1%) 
9 
(42.9%) 
8 
(4.8%) 
6 
(75.0%) 
2 
(25.0%) 
Peace/unity 
22  
(12.3%) 
1 
(4.3%) 
22 
(95.7%) 
17 
(10.2%) 
1 
(5.9%) 
16 
(94.1%) 
Human rights/ 
freedom 
8  
(4.3%) 
2 
(25.0%) 
6 
(75.0%) 
14 
(8.9%) 
5 
(35.7%) 
9 
(64.3%) 
Social solidarity/ 
welfare 
9  
(4.8%) 
2 
(22.2%) 
7 
(77.8%) 
8 
(4.9%) 
5 
(62.5%) 
3 
(37.5%) 
European interests/ 
values/identities 
12  
(6.4%) 
3 
(25.0%) 
9 
(75.0%) 
36 
(21.6%) 
4 
(11.1%) 
32 
(88.9%) 
National interests/ 
values/identities 
18  
(9.6%) 
10 
(55.6%) 
8 
(44.4%) 
10 
(6.0%) 
6 
(60.0%) 
4 
(40.0%) 
Positive role in the 
world 
11  
(5.9%) 
6 
(54.5%) 
5 
(45.5%) 
8 
(4.9%) 
4 
(50.0%) 
4 
(50.0%) 
Sum output-oriented 
patterns 
109 
(58.3%) 
41 
(37.6%) 
68 
(62.4%) 
111 
(66.5%) 
37 
(33.3%) 
74 
(66.7%) 
Others (idiosyncratic 
patterns) 
15  
(8.0%) 
7 
(46.7%) 
8 
(53.3%) 
16 
(9.6%) 
10 
(62.5%) 
6 
(37.5%) 
Total 
187  
(100.0%) 
106 
(56.7%) 
81 
(43.3%) 
167  
(100.0%) 
75 
(44.9%) 
92 
(55.1%) 
 
 Multilevel Legitimacy in the European Union  Page 19  
Again, it is interesting to compare these findings to the results of the parallel study 
on nation-state institutions. The comparison shows that in both countries, evaluations of 
the EU focused less on input-oriented criteria and more on output-oriented criteria than 
evaluations of domestic institutions.
10 If input-oriented criteria were used, evaluations of 
the EU were more likely to turn out negative than evaluations of domestic institutions.
11 
By contrast, if output-oriented criteria were used, evaluations were more likely to be 
positive than in the nation-state case.
12 We can conclude that legitimation discourses 
about the EU indeed differ from legitimation discourses about the nation state: Output-
oriented criteria are more important, but their use also tends to result in a greater share of 
positive assessments than the application of similar criteria to the nation state. 
A look at individual patterns reveals that four arguments in particular proved crucial 
for sustaining positive evaluations of the EU: the fact that it has secured peace and unity 
on the continent; that it embodies and protects freedom and human rights; that it stands 
for social solidarity (this pattern is associated with mainly positive evaluations only in the 
                                                 
10  In  the  Guardian, 53.1% of legitimation statements on domestic institutions were input-oriented 
(compared to 33.7% of statements on the EU), and 34.4% were output-oriented (EU: 58.3%). For the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, the domestic figures were 35.9% input-oriented statements (EU: 24.0%) and 
42.4% output-oriented (EU: 66.5%). In both cases, the data for domestic institutions refers to all 
legitimation statements in the whole year 2004. 
11  In the Guardian, 74.4% of all input-oriented evaluations of domestic institutions were delegitimating 
(compared to 92.1% in the EU case study); in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, input-oriented evaluations 
turned out negative in 60.0% of the cases (EU case study: 70.0%). 
12  In the Guardian, 53.3% of all output-oriented evaluations of domestic institutions were delegitimating 
(EU: 37.6%); in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the delegitimation rate was 54.9% (EU: 33.3%). 
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UK); and that it embodies and promotes common European interests and/or values.
13 We 
should note that all of these particularly powerful patterns of legitimation, while clearly 
pointing to contents and outcomes of European integration, are one step removed from 
the most pressing issues and priorities of current EU governance. References to output-
oriented patterns that bear a closer relationship to current activities of the EU – most 
importantly, its effectiveness, economic performance, and role in the world – tend to be 
associated with negative evaluations. This indicates that opinion leaders who shape 
public discourse in the UK and Germany value the EU’s general qualities and long-term 
achievements, while problems regarding its current political performance – alongside 
with the insufficiently democratic nature of its institutions – provide key reference points 
for delegitimation.  
5  MULTILEVEL LEGITIMACY: HOW THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EU RELATES 
TO THAT OF ITS MEMBER STATES 
After having gained a better understanding of the objects and patterns of legitimation 
used in evaluations of the EU, we can now turn to the question how such evaluations 
relate to judgements about the member states. As was discussed above, such multilevel 
legitimacy constructions can take one of two forms: either the legitimacy of the EU and 
                                                 
13  This pattern, which was particularly important in Germany, was coded irrespectively of the specific 
interests or values that were described as ‘European’. References to human dignity, consensus-seeking 
behavior, and modesty were particularly frequent, while there was some dispute about whether these 
values could be described as peculiarly ‘Christian’. Statements pointing to the principles of individual 
rights and democracy were also coded as ‘European interests/values/identities’ if these principles were 
not portrayed as characteristics of the EU and its institutions but as values uniting all Europeans. 
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the legitimacy of one of its member states are explicitly related (multiunit evaluation), or 
both levels of governance are amalgamated to form an integrated object of legitimation 
(integrated evaluation). 
Arguably,  integrated evaluations constitute a particularly advanced form of 
multilevel legitimacy, since the boundaries between political levels disappear behind a 
construction of ‘Europe’ as a common whole. As discussed above, such references to 
‘Europe’ were particularly frequent in Germany and, most remarkably, also tended to 
coincide with a high share of legitimating as opposed to delegitimating evaluations. In 
fact, as Table 5 shows, without integrated evaluations, the German statements would 
have been mainly delegitimating. To understand how such evaluations were constructed, 
it makes sense to look at a characteristic example: 
‘Chancellor Gerhard Schröder praised the assassination attempt against Adolf Hitler sixty years ago 
as a struggle of the German resistance “for freedom and justice, against tyranny and military 
aggression”. He portrayed this struggle as “the most important basis for what unites us in Europe”. 
He said that the memory of the assassins constituted an obligation for Germans “not to abate in 
working for the further integration of our common Europe”.’ (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 21 July 2004)
14
Although the article from which this statement was drawn deals with domestic German 
politics – a memorial celebration for army officers who tried to assassinate Adolf Hitler 
on 20 July 1944 –, this event is immediately ‘Europeanized’ by portraying the values of 
                                                 
14 Original text: ‘Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder würdigte das Attentat auf Adolf Hitler vor sechzig 
Jahren als Kampf des deutschen Widerstands “für Freiheit und Recht, gegen Gewaltherrschaft und 
militärische Aggression”. Dieser Kampf sei “die wichtigste Grundlage dessen, was uns in Europa eint”. Die 
Erinnerung an die Attentäter verpflichte die Deutschen, “nicht nachzulassen bei der weiteren Integration 
unseres gemeinsamen Europas”.’ 
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the German resistance as principles that unite – and legitimate – ‘our common Europe’. 
Clearly, this assessment refers not only to EU institutions, but also to the EU member 
states, including Germany. The boundaries between the national and the European level 
of governance become blurred, ‘Europe’ appears on the scene as an integrated object of 
legitimation. It is evident that such constructions can be a very powerful legitimating 
device, since European governance is no longer associated only with an abstract set of 
EU institutions, but with a European polity in its own right. What is also typical about the 
statement quoted above is that it links the reference to ‘Europe’ to a value-based form of 
legitimation. In fact, the connection of ‘Europe’ as object and ‘European 
interests/values/identities’ as pattern of legitimation is the single most frequent 
combination between an object and a pattern of legitimation in the German debates, and 
it almost always results in positive assessments. 
While references to ‘Europe’ were not completely lacking in British debates, they 
were much less frequent. Even more significantly, about half of the statements that 
referred to ‘Europe’ in the British material did not refer to an integrated political entity of 
which Britain is a part, but rather to an outside ‘other’ that is compared – often 
unfavorably – with the UK. To give one example:  
‘[Chancellor of the Exchequer] Gordon Brown yesterday hinted at future tax breaks for the City as 
he vowed to defend London’s position as one of the world’s leading financial centres from over-
regulation and higher costs. With the Conservatives seeking to rebuild their pro-City credentials, the 
chancellor contrasted “one of Britain’s great global success stories” with a Europe in need of radical 
reform to make it more competitive.’ (Guardian, 6 April 2004) 
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Table 5 Forms of Multilevel Legitimacy 
  United Kingdom  Germany 
...of which  ...of which 
Form of multilevel 
evaluation 
Number of 
statements  Delegiti-
mating  
Legiti-
mating  
Number of 
statements)  Delegiti-
mating  
Legiti-
mating  
Multiunit evaluation 
37 
(19.8%) 
20 
(54.1%) 
17 
(45.9%) 
5 
(3.0%) 
3 
(60.0%) 
2 
(40.0%) 
Negative-sum 
5 
(2.7%) 
5 
(100.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
2 
(1.2%) 
2 
(100.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Positive-sum 
12 
(6.4%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
12 
(100.0%) 
2 
(1.2%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
2 
(100.0%) 
…of 
which 
Zero-sum 
20 
(10.7%) 
15 
(75.0%) 
5 
(25.0%) 
1 
(0.6%) 
1 
(100.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Integrated evaluation 
14 
(7.5%) 
4 
(28.6%) 
10 
(71.4%) 
64 
(38.3%) 
18 
(28.1%) 
46 
(71.9%) 
No multilevel evaluation 
136 
(72.7%) 
82 
(60.3%) 
54 
(39.7%) 
98 
(58.7%) 
54 
(55.1%) 
44 
(44.9%) 
Total 
187  
(100.0%) 
106 
(56.7%) 
81 
(43.3%) 
167  
(100.0%) 
75 
(44.9%) 
92 
(55.1%) 
 
If we discount such cases in which ‘Europe’ is portrayed as an ‘other’, only 7.5% of all 
British legitimation statements can be described as integrated legitimacy assessments, 
compared to 38.3% in Germany (Table 5). By contrast, multiunit assessments in which 
the national and the European level of governance are not amalgamated, but explicitly 
related to each other, are much more frequent in Britain than in Germany (19.8% of all 
statements compared to 3.0%). Three types of such multiunit evaluations can be 
distinguished: In negative-sum evaluations, legitimacy deficits of one level or governance 
are seen as undermining the legitimacy of the other political level as well; in positive-sum 
evaluations, the interplay of both levels bolsters the legitimacy of each of them; while in 
zero-sum evaluations, legitimacy deficits of one level are treated as arguments 
underscoring the other level’s legitimacy (Hurrelmann 2007b).  
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A look at our data shows that when it comes to their legitimating or delegitimating 
content (with respect to the EU), the multiunit assessments used in the UK do not differ 
significantly from the average of all British statements. This can be explained by the fact 
that zero-sum evaluations, particularly those that legitimate British institutions by 
pointing to weaknesses of the EU, are the most popular form of multiunit assessments in 
the UK. Characteristically, such statements relate the quality of British democracy to the 
(allegedly) undemocratic and illegal ways in which EU politics are conducted. To give an 
example: 
‘Yesterday the Thatcherite Lord Pearson of Rannoch […] threatened to quit the Tories to join the 
UKIP, a move that would heap […] embarrassment on his party. […] “Within the party we have 
failed to persuade [party leader] Michael Howard to take a much tougher line towards the EU,” he 
said. “A solid swing to UKIP [in the EP election] on June 10 might help to do so. The only party 
which might save our democracy, our right to govern ourselves, from the corrupt octopus in Brussels 
is the Conservatives. […]”.’ (Guardian, 31 May 2004) 
In this statement, the UK is legitimated as a democracy precisely by contrasting it to the 
‘corrupt octopus’ of the EU. This construction highlights that membership in a project of 
regional integration, even if this is viewed critically, does not necessarily undermine the 
empirical legitimacy of the nation state, but might rather generate new argumentative 
‘resources’ to underscore the acceptability of national institutions. By contrast, negative-
sum evaluations in which the legitimacy deficits of the EU are seen as already having 
undermined the legitimacy of British institutions (rather than threatening to do so) were 
quite rare in the material analyzed here. 
On the other hand, there were a number of examples in the British debates for 
constructions of positive-sum relationships between the legitimacy of the EU and the 
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British nation state. In contrast to integrated legitimacy assessments, positive-sum 
statements still clearly distinguish between a national and a European level of 
governance, but argue that one level profits from the legitimacy of the other. Again, an 
example might help to clarify how such arguments are constructed: 
‘[Prime Minister Tony] Blair’s original insight over Europe was that it represented an essential 
modernisation for the British. It was a political project that pushed out nostalgic nationalism as a real 
force; which cemented social democratic values; and which gave Britain a place in the world 
alongside our real family, rather than yearning after vanished supremacies.’ (Guardian, 8 April 
2004) 
Here, the EU is legitimated on the grounds that it helps Britain defend its values and take 
a relevant role in the world, and hence contributes to the legitimacy of the British 
political system. While the linkage that is constructed between the European and the 
national political level is not quite as seamless as in the case of integrated legitimacy 
assessments, it is clear that such claims of a harmonious and mutually beneficial interplay 
of European and national institutions can also form a very strong argument to underscore 
the legitimacy of the EU.
15
                                                 
15  In an earlier article, I have described this particular construction as operating according to a ‘logic of 
complementarity’, meaning that the European and the national level of governance are legitimated 
because they are seen as effectively supplementing each other (Hurrelmann 2007b). The empirical 
examples of positive-sum legitimacy relationships that could be found in the present case study mainly 
took this form, rather than one of the others that can be defined theoretically: a ‘logic of analogy’ (the 
European level of governance is legitimate because it is similar to the national one) or a ‘logic of 
derivation’ (the European level of governance is legitimate because it is derived from the national one). 
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We can conclude that different forms of multilevel legitimacy indeed play a 
substantial role in mass-media legitimacy discourses in the UK and especially Germany. 
However, multilevel legitimacy is constructed quite differently in the two countries: 
While in Germany, integrated evaluations of the European multilevel system are quite 
common and play a crucial role in accounting for the positive overall character of EU-
related discourse, British speakers tend to construct multilevel legitimacy mainly in the 
form of multiunit evaluations in which both levels of governance are evaluated 
separately, but in an interlinked way. On balance, these multiunit evaluations do not turn 
out any more positive or negative than evaluations in which no legitimacy relationship is 
established. 
6  CONCLUSION 
The case study of British and German media debates in 2004 demonstrates that a number 
of insights into the empirical legitimacy of the EU can be gained by moving beyond 
public opinion surveys and complementing them with research on the communicative 
dimension of legitimacy. With respect to the aspects of the EU that are evaluated (i.e., 
objects of legitimation), the undifferentiated character of most assessments in public 
discourse casts some doubt on the validity of Eurobarometer figures distinguishing how 
much citizens trust various EU institutions. A more salient distinction emerging from the 
present study is that between the EU as a specific level of governance and ‘Europe’ as an 
integrated polity, which is often evaluated more positively than its individual institutions. 
With respect to the criteria on which legitimacy assessments are based (i.e., patterns of 
legitimation), this study indicates that the empirical legitimacy of the EU is based mainly 
on output-oriented standards, particularly ones that are associated with the long-term 
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achievements of European integration (peace, freedom, solidarity, common values), 
rather than the short-term results of EU policies. By contrast, the use of input-oriented 
legitimation criteria such as democracy and popular trust generally results in 
delegitimation. Finally, my study suggests that constructions of multilevel legitimacy – in 
the form of either integrated or multiunit assessments – play a significant role in shaping 
national debates about the EU. Particularly in Germany, evaluations of ‘Europe’ as an 
integrated entity encompassing both the EU and its member states are quite frequent, and 
account for a large share of positive assessments of European governance.  
These insights are not only valuable for identifying perceived strengths and 
weaknesses of the EU, they can also provide useful information for political intervention: 
Knowledge about how legitimating and delegitimating arguments about European 
governance are constructed in public discourse is crucial for attempts to reform the EU to 
make it more appealing to Europeans, as well as for image campaigns that seek to find 
better ways to ‘sell’ the existing European construction to the citizenry. All along, we 
must of course take into account that an analysis of media debates does not provide 
insights into the opinion of the general population, but rather focuses on political elites 
that serve as opinion leaders. Research on the communicative aspect of legitimacy should 
thus be seen as a complement rather than a replacement of public opinion studies. 
Nevertheless, especially in a polity like the EU that is not particularly salient in the view 
of the citizens, media discourses that shape public perceptions of legitimacy can be 
expected to be a more reliable source of data, and also a more influential political force to 
reckon with, than the survey-generated ‘opinions’ of ill-informed citizens. 
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